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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. ; 
BUDD D. LEE and JESSIE R. LEE; ] 
ALLEN LEE; and CLAYTON LEE, ) 
Defendants/Appellees. ) 
i Case No. 930763-CA 
i Priority 15 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (j) (1992) and the transfer provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) (1992). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant must marshall the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings. Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P. 2d 919, 922 
(Utah, 1988). This Court will review the evidence to determine 
whether the trial court's findings are supported by the evidence 
and will not disturb the trial court's refusal to grant a motion 
for immediate occupancy absent a clear abuse of discretion. State 
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 332 P. 2d 926 (1958); 
Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P. 2d 182 (Utah, 1977). 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1992) 
Before property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) that the use to which it is to be 
applied is a use authorized by law; 
(2) that the taking is necessary to such use. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1992) 
The plaintiff may move the court...for an order 
permitting the plaintiff to occupy the premises 
sought to be condemned pending the action... The 
court or a judge thereof shall take proof... of 
the reasons for acquiring a speedy occupation, 
and shall grant or refuse the motion according 
to the equity of the case and the relative damage 
which may accrue to the parties. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. There was substantial competent evidence to support the 
trial court's determination that there was not an adequate showing 
of necessity for an immediate taking of the appellees1 property. 
UDOT had previously acquired property from the appellees for the 
purpose of realigning SR-9 and had done so. UDOT failed to make 
a showing that there was a public need to again realign the road 
and in the process take the appellees1 home and business because 
there was only speculation that sometime in the future a slide may 
occur. 
II. The Court did not err as to the burden of proof because 
it rendered its decision after receiving evidence and expert 
testimony presented by the owners which it was entitled to weigh 
against the evidence presented by UDOT. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UDOT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSITY 
FOR IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY OF LEE'S PROPERTY 
The Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") acquired a 
portion of Defendant/Appellees1 ("Lees") property for the purpose 
of realigning SR 9. During the construction there occurred 
several "slides" from the area where UDOT was removing material 
from the hillside where it was relocating the road. UDOT removed 
the material which had moved and made several revisions in the 
slope of the disturbed area from that which it had originally 
engineered. (Tr., 6/28/93, pp. 19-24). UDOT completed the roadbed, 
put down an asphalt surface and opened the new section of highway 
to traffic in September, 1992.(Transcript, 6/28/93,p. 42). There 
was no evidence presented to show that there was any further 
problems with the embankment.(Tr, 6/28/93, p. 45). UDOT did not 
erect any signs warning the traveling public that it was a "slide 
area" or to "watch for falling rocks".(Tr., 6/28/93, pp. 47,48). 
Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P. 2d 182 (Utah 1977) is 
instructive in the instant case. There the Court found that the 
county's intended use of the property it sought to condemn was 
"uncertain, indefinite, speculative, and not within the foreseeable 
future." Here the question is not as UDOT tries to define it, 
whether the highway project is uncertain, indefinite, speculative, 
or within the foreseeable future.(UDOT brief, p. 11) . It is, 
rather, whether the need for the Lee property is such. UDOT has 
not suggested that the highway as it now exists after the 
realignment needs to be replaced because it is not an adequate, 
3 
modern highway. It merely speculates that if a slide should occur 
in the future it may be more costly to maintain than if it were to 
again realign the section of the highway across the property where 
the Lees have their homestead and business. UDOT offered no cost 
comparisons to show that the cost of condemnation and rebuilding 
would be less than the speculative costs of removal of material 
which may slide toward the highway. 
UDOT presented no evidence that the highway as it now is used 
is dangerous. The fact that it erected no warning signs, commonly 
seen in the mountainous ares of the state, indicates that there is 
no present danger which would require it to warn the traveling 
public. 
POINT II 
THE DENIAL OF UDOTfS MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE 
OCCUPANCY WAS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE 
UDOTfs assertion that the trial court mishandled the burden of 
proof is simply unfounded. The trial court did not summarily deny 
UDOT's motion; rather it heard extensive testimony presented by the 
Lees which included the expert testimony of Dr. Richard Kennedy, an 
eminent geologist, whose testimony was persuasive that there was no 
physical evidence to support UDOT's speculation that a slide may 
occur sometime in the future. He testified that after examining 
the site and particularly in consideration of the recent earthquake 
in the area and the unusually wet weather, that there was no reason 
to suggest that there would be any problem with the highway as it 
now exists. (Tr. 7/20/93, p. 23) He also testified that there were 
other areas which did show evidence of slide problems and pointed 
4 
out the difference in the geology of the subject property to 
support his opinion that there was nothing wrong with the section 
of highway in question.(Tr. 7/20/93, pp. 54-56). 
The trial court has discretion to determine that UDOT did not 
sustain its burden of showing necessity. Having decided to refuse 
UDOT's motion, the trial courtfs discretion should not be disturbed 
on appeal. Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining 
Co., 255 P. 672 (Utah, 1926); State v. Denver & Rio grande Western 
Railroad Co., 332 P.2d 926 (Utah, 1958); Salt Lake County v. 
Ramoselli,567 P. 2d 182 (Utah, 1977). 
While the power of eminent domain is considerable it is not 
without limit. The federal and Utah constitutions protect the 
right to possess and enjoy property. Those constitutional 
guaranties should not be brushed aside by a government agency which 
cannot adequately show a public need to take private property. 
Here, a family which has lived and done business in the same place 
for many years would be displaced with no place to relocate its 
business. A grave injustice would be done if UDOT was allowed to 
take the Lees' property in a summary fashion where there has been 
only a weak claim for a public need. 
The Courts should always be available to protect the 
constitutional rights of its citizens, who otherwise would be 
subjected to the oppression of an overreaching government agency. 
Each case must be viewed on the facts and merits of the case 
presented by those who would take another citizen's property. The 
trial court was acting within its sound discretion when it denied 
UDOT's motion for immediate occupancy. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial courtfs order denying UDOT's motion for immediate 
occupancy is supported by ample evidence and should not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
DATED this day of March, 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
\ M-
-SEPH ^ ARLAN BURNS 
ttorney for Defendants/Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellees were mailed first class, postage prepaid to Donald S. 
Coleman, Assistant Attorney General, attorney for UDOT, 412 0 State 
Office Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT I 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
tf^tbrA N> 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BUDD D. LEE, JESSIE R. LEE, 
ALLEN LEE, and CLAYTON LEE, 
Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 930500474 
The above-entitled matter came" be fore the Court for hearing on the Plaintiffs motion for 
Order of Immediate Occupancy. The Court held two hearings on this matter, one on June 28, 
1993, and the other on July 20, 1993. Judge James L. Shumate presided at both hearings, he 
having heard the initial proceeding in substitution for Judge J. Philip Eves who was out of the 
District on June 28, 1993. The Plaintiff was represented by Assistant Attorney General, Donald 
Coleman at both hearings. The Defendants appeared and were represented by their attorney, 
Joseph Harlan Burns, at both hearings. The Court visited the location of the property which is 
the subject of this litigation and viewed the subject property and walked over the landslide area 
north of Highway SR-9 and opposite the Defendant's property. The Court's visit to the 
property was on July 8,1993. The Court, with the stipulation of counsel, determined that the 
Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy should be decided in two phases. The first phase 
is for the Court to determine the issues under Section 78-34-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, to wit: 
78-34-4. Conditions precedent to taking. 
Before property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) that the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law; 
(2) that the taking is necessary to such use; 
(3) that construction and use of all property sought to be condemned will commence 
within a reasonable time as determined by the court, after the initiation of 
proceedings under this chapter; and 
(4) if already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which it is to be 
applied is a more necessary public use. 
The second phase is for the Court to determine (if the conditions precedent in the first phase 
have been met) the "value of the premises sought to be condemned, and of the damages which 
will accrue from the condemnation, . . . " 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties and in view of the reasonable scheduling of 
judicial time in this matter, this Memorandum Decision addresses only the issues of the necessity 
of the taking of the Defendant's property. With this objective in mind and after having heard 
the testimony, reviewed the exhibits, viewed the location and considering the arguments of 
counsel, the Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Utah highway SR-9 runs east-west from the 1-15 freeway, 16 miles north of the Utah-
Arizona border through the towns of Hurricane, Virgin, Rockville, Springdale and thence into 
Zion National Park. This highway is the major access to Zion National Park from the west. 
2. During the summer of 1992 the Plaintiff, Department of Transportation, was in the 
process of re-aligning and re-constructing SR-9 east of the town of Virgin in the area of the 
Defendant's subject property. Prior to 1992, SR-9 ran south of the Defendants' parcel. After 
the 1992 re-alignment the newly constructed roadway lay to the north of the Defendants' real-
geology department, estimated that there was approximately one-hundred twenty-five thousand 
cubic yards of material remaining on top of the slide plane. The Department of Transportation 
spent $584,000.00 to remove material that had already slumped during the construction of the 
new highway allignment. 
9. On September 2, 1992, the southern portion of Washington County was shaken by 
an earthquake measuring a magnitude of 5.5 on the Richter Scale. The epicenter of that 
earthquake was 25 miles west and south of the landslide in question. The Court finds from the 
testimony of Dr. Kennedy, Mr. Budd Lee, and also through judicial notice under Rule 201 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, that there was no movement of this landslide during that substantial 
earthquake. The Court also finds that SR-9 was blocked by another landslide 10 miles east and 
further from the epicenter of the September 2, 1992, earthquake in the slide hill area of 
Springdale, Utah, just south of the boundary of Zion National Park. That earthquake placed 
boulders nearly eight feet in diameter on the surface oFSR-9 just west of the subject landslide 
and also deposited smaller rocks, some two to three feet in diameter just east of the subject slide 
area. No debris was deposited on the road surface from the landslide that is the subject of this 
litigation during that earthquake. 
10. The winter of 1992-93 was particularly wet in Washington County with high water 
and local flooding along the Santa Clara and Virgin Rivers. Near record amounts of 
precipitation were recorded along the entire watershed of the Virgin River including the area of 
this landslide. No substantial motion of the landslide was observed during this wet season or 
in the months since. 
11. Neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant presented any evidence of measurement to 
show the presence or lack of movement along the slide. This lack of evidence is notable since 
estate, leaving the Defendants' property as an island of some 2.81 acres (see Exhibit No. 18) 
between the old and new highways. On the Defendants' property, to the east of the residence, 
there is a cultural site described in the documents supporting the affidavit of Susan G. Miller as 
a Virgin Anasazi habitation site. The Court finds that the cultural compliance requirements of 
the State of Utah and the Federal Government have been met and that the Paiute Tribe of Utah 
has filed notice with the Court of its intention to take no action with respect to this site. 
3. Immediately to the north of the new highway the topography rises rapidly to a mesa 
which comprises the northern boundary of the Virgin River Valley in that location. The 
southern edge of that mesa slopes sharply downward to the south, reaching the valley floor in 
the area of the new highway, (see Exhibits 32 and 33) 
4. The construction of the new alignment for SR-9 required the removal of a portion of 
the natural slope from the mesa in an area roughly paralleling the highway . As the natural 
material was removed from the foot of the srtope a landslide developed. The top of the slide is 
clearly visible on the photographic exhibits where the loose material of the natural slope has 
moved downhill, toward the new highway, and exposed the columnar formations typically found 
at the edges of basalt layers. 
5. The slide moved on three distinct dates. The first motion was observed by Plaintiffs 
engineer, Mr. Kenneth R. Burgess, on June 19, 1992. This slide was described as containing 
approximately one-third of the final amount of material which moved downhill. The slide next 
moved on July 22, 1992, when material in the center of the slide area, approximately one-
hundred feet in width, travelled downhill. The final, and largest of the three movements was 
on August 3, 1992. After this slide Mr. Burgess estimated, and the Court so finds, that some 
six-hundred thousand cubic yards of material had moved between June 19 and August 3, 1992. 
6. The new highway was under construction all through the period of these slides. As 
each motion took place, the engineering and geological experts from the Department of 
Transportation would review the circumstances and adjust the design of the slope along the slide. 
It was finally determined that the slope along the slide would be "laid back" at a ratio of 1.8 to 
1, but that the highway itself should be re-aligned to the south of the new highway in order to 
avoid the slide area. The new alignment of the highway takes all of the 2.81 acres of the 
Defendants' property, (see Exhibit 16 ) 
7. The Court finds that, even though the Plaintiff determined after the last slide of 
August 3, 1992, the highway should be re-aligned, the Department of Transportation continued 
in the construction of the new highway in its originally planned alignment. The final paving on 
the new highway was complete in the month of October 1992, and the highway, as shown in 
Exhibits 32 and 33, continues to appear-as it did when it was completed. At no time has the 
Plaintiff placed any signs, flashers, flags or other warnings along the new highway to warn 
motorists of any danger from material falling onto the roadway from the slide. This lawsuit 
to condemn the Defendants' property was not filed until April 14, 1993. 
8. This landslide moves along what is referred to by the experts as a slide plane. The 
slide plane is that surface, below the sliding material, which remains stationary while the body 
of the slide moves above and along the slide plane. The upper edge of the slide plane is clearly 
visible on the exhibits as the top of the lighter-colored cliffs, the columnar basalt formations. 
The lower edge of the slide plane is visible on the photographs and was viewed by this judge 
as being approximately ten to twelve feet above the grade of the road surface. 
The slide plane itself is covered by the slumping material which lies on top of the plane between 
the upper and lower edges. The Defendants' expert, Dr. Kennedy of Southern Utah University's 
modern surveying and engineering tools employing laser range finders should make such 
measurement relatively simple. The Court finds, from the judge's own observations and the 
photographic Exhibits 19, 21, 24, and 25, that the tracks left by the construction equipment on 
the face of the slide show no evidence of motion on the face of the slide. 
12. The Court specifically finds that the Plaintiff is not acting in bad faith in seeking to 
take the Defendants' property. The Court finds, and the record clearly supports, that the 
Plaintiffs primary concern for this action is the safety of the public making use of SR-9 coupled 
with the preservation of public funds that might be expended in maintaining the road in its 
present location next to the landslide. 
13. The proposed use of the Defendants' property for a re-alignment of SR-9 is a public 
use authorized by law. 
14. The Court specifically finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, under the present 
circumstances and looking at the tortarffty of the evidence before the Court, that there is 
insufficient evidence to support the claim of the Plaintiff that the landslide in question is 
currently moving or that it presents a present danger to the traveling public on SR-9. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The issue before the Court has been narrowly framed by both the stipulation of the 
parties and the foregoing factual setting. The task of the Court is bounded by the language of 
Section 78-34-9 which states: 
The court or a judge thereof shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the 
premises sought to be condemned and of the damages which will accrue from the condemnation, 
and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion 
according to the equity of the case and the relative damages which may accrue to the parties. 
The process of determining whether or not to "grant or refuse" the motion for immediate 
occupancy is substantially complicated by the existing case law in this field. The Plaintiff has 
cited the Court to Utah Department of Transportation v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 (Utah, 1979). 
The Fuller case favorably quotes an earlier case, Postal Telegraph Cable Co. of Utah v. Oregon 
Short Line Railroad Co., 65 P. 735 (Utah, 1901) as follows: 
It may be said to be a general rule that, unless a corporation exercising the power of 
eminent domain acts in bad faith or is guilty of oppression, its discretion in the selection of land 
will not be interfered with. With the degree of necessity or the extent which the property will 
advance the public purpose, the courts have nothing to do. When the use is public, the necessity 
or expediency of appropriating any particular property is not a subject of judicial cognizance. 
[Citations omitted.] 
The limitation on the scope of judicial review of the selection of sites taken under eminent 
domain powers is also described in 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain, [hereafter Nichols], § 
4.11[3], at 4-184, 4-185: 
[The] legislature may, and usually does, delegate the power of selecting the land to be 
condemned to the public agent that is to do the work; in such case it makes little, if any, 
difference whether the grant of authority is, in terms, limited to such land as is 'necessary' for 
the purpose in view, for a general grant of authunty carries the same limitation by implication 
and in either case the necessity is for th^condemnor and not for the courts to decide, and the 
decision of such condemnor is final is long as it acts: reasonably and in good faith. 
The Department of Transportation urges this Court to follow the above-stated "general 
rule" and order the immediate occupancy of the Defendants' land because there is no evidence 
before the Court that would indicate that the Department is acting in bad faith or is guilty of 
oppression. 
2. Counsel for the Defendants calls the Court's attention to the case of Salt Lake County 
v. Ramoselli, 567 P. 2d 182 (Utah, 1977) which tells the Court: 
The power of eminent domain is not to be exercised thoughtlessly or arbitrarily and the 
courts possess full authority to determine the proper limits of the power to prevent abuses in its 
exercise, and litigants should, and do have great latitude in conferring dispositive functions 
upon the court as they clearly did in this instance. 
The question of necessity of the taking is the functional prerogative of the judicial system 
and that principle of law is stated in Nichols on Eminent Domain as follows: 
... 'In every case, therefore, there is a judicial question whether the taking is of such a 
nature that it is or may be founded on public necessity. \ . . 
InRamoselli, supra., the parties had stipulated to a bifurcated proceeding in which the trial court 
first determined the necessity of the taking. Such a stipulation has occurred in this case as well. 
3. In determining the necessity of the taking of the Defendants' property the Court relies 
on the definition of that term given in Williams v. Hvrum Gibbons & Sons Co., 602 P.2d 684 
(Utah, 1979). In that case the Utah Supreme Court discussed the use of the term "necessity" 
as follows: 
Where the legislature has conferred upon the court as in the case of 78-34-8(1), the duty 
of determining the necessity of a proposed taking, the necessity must be established by evidence 
or the proceeding fails. Necessity does not signify impossibility of constructing the improvement 
for which the power has been granted without taking the land in question; it merely requires the 
land be reasonably suitable and userti/ for tAe improvement. 
Th^ court in Montana Highway- Commission v. Crossen-Nissen Co., 400 P. 2d 283 
(Mont., 1965) interpreted a statute similar to 78 34-4, an<j necessity for the property taken did 
not mean that it must be indispensable 'o the proposed project. The word 'necessary' as used 
in the statute [93-9905, RCM 1947] coonoced that the particular property taken was reasonably 
requisite and proper for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was sought under the 
peculiar circumstances of each case. 
Alaska has construed A.S.09.55.270(2), viz., 'the taking is necessary to the use,' similar 
to Montana in City of Fairbanks v. Metro Company. 540 p. 2d 1056 (Alaska, 1975) The court 
explained: 
• •• once the condemnor has presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that a 
particular taking is 'reasonably requisite' for the effectuation of the authorized public purpose 
for which it is sought, particular questions as to the routs, location, or amount of property to 
be taken are left to the sound discretion of the condemning authority absent a showing by clear 
and convincing evidence that such determinations are the product of fraud, caprice, or 
arbitrariness.... 
4. The Court does not adopt the position advocated by the Plaintiff that once a 
condemning authority shows a prima facie case of public necessity, the burden of proof shifts 
to the Defendant to show that the authority is acting in bad faith or that the authority is 
oppressive in its desire to condemn. In determining if the taking of the Defendants' property 
in this case is "reasonably requisite and proper " lor the needs of the travelling public Finding 
of Fact No. Fourteen above does not support the Plaintiffs position. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED , that the Plaintiffs Motion 
for Order of Immediate Occupancy is DENIED without prejudice. If the landslide begins to 
move again, the Plaintiff may apply for such an order again. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, under the facts of this case, that this is a final order, 
which, having disposed of the threshold question before the Court , is appealable under the 
provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this Ztf day of July, 1993. 
^ D I S T R I C T JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy °fJ£g>$bove a nd foregoing 
Memorandum Decision and by first class mail, postage pre-paid thisyv^aay of July, 1993, to 
the following: 
Donald Coleman 
Assistant Attorney General 
4120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Joseph Harlan Burns 
P.O. Box 6330 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-6330 
U.l\k 
Deputy Court C\le 
